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BUREAUCRATIC LEGALISM, AMERICAN STYLE:
PRIVATE BUREAUCRATIC LEGALISM AND THE
GOVERNANCE OF THE TORT SYSTEM
John Fabian Witt*

INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this Article is that while the modern plaintiffs' bar
serves a crucial regulatory function in American public policy, the way
we regulate the regulators warrants attention and perhaps even revision. The modern plaintiffs' bar began in what its progenitors described as a movement to defend the rule of law against the
administrative and bureaucratic incursions of the twentieth-century
state. The chief villain in the early years of the plaintiffs' bar was the
bureaucratic state functionary. Vested with substantial discretionary
authority and subject only loosely-if at all-to the traditions and
constraints of law, the bureaucrat seemed to threaten the rule of law
traditions of Anglo-American governance. Leading spokesmen of the
plaintiffs' bar contended that the bureaucrat was akin to "a little
dictator."'
And yet today, the American plaintiffs' tort bar has a rule of law
problem of its own. In many areas of American personal injury practice, tort law has given rise to a far-flung, decentralized, and often
virtually invisible private bureaucracy. In that vast administrative system, the plaintiff's representative has come to enjoy some of the same
discretionary authority that plaintiffs' lawyers criticized in public bureaucrats of the welfare state. In some important respects, the plaintiffs' bar is remarkably unconstrained. Plaintiffs' personal injury
lawyers typically work for relatively powerless clients, under ineffective ethical canons, and without meaningful monitoring by bar associations or other professional organizations. Moreover, trial
lawyers operate in a market for legal services that is,
at best, relatively
* Professor of Law and History, Columbia University. Many thanks to Sam Issacharoff, Bert
Kritzer, Bob Rabin, and Cathy Sharkey for helpful comments on the manuscript, and to Alexander Michaels for excellent research assistance.
1. The historical elements of this paper draw heavily on my long chapter, "The King and the
Dean: Melvin Belli, Roscoe Pound, and the Common-Law Nation." JOHN FABIAN WI-r, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 211-78 (forthcoming
2007).
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disorganized and, at worst, perversely organized to serve the bar's interests rather than the interests of personal injury victims.
This is a significant problem for American public policy. As political scientists, historians, and tort lawyers are coming to understand
better and better, the United States is distinctively reliant on lawyers
and the courts to accomplish many of its social policy goals, particularly the delivery of deterrence and compensation in the personal injury area. 2 As much as $250 billion flows through the tort system each
year, a figure that is about the same as the yearly amount paid to the
recipients of old-age pensions through the Social Security system. 3 In
many respects, this "American way of law" is deeply flawed. The tort
system is expensive, erratic, unpredictable, nontransparent, and unaccountable. These are all serious criticisms. But for the moment, it is
worth marveling at the genius of the private, market-driven regulatory
system that is American tort law. It is a highly flexible, fast-moving,
decentralized, and entrepreneurial engine for the provision of social
policy goods such as deterrence and compensation. In an age in which
so many New Deal-era regulatory systems have fallen on hard times,
and other nation-states are starting to think twice about adopting
American-style legal professions, the virtues of the market-driven
American tort system are at least as apparent as its flaws.
The question this Article addresses is whether there are ways to
capture the benefits of the private tort system while constraining the
discretionary authority of the plaintiffs' bar and reducing some of the
agency costs that result from that discretion. Are there ways to reduce the costs of tort and minimize the effects of relying on a private
market for tort claims, while not undermining the benefits of flexibility, agility, and resistance to capture that tort seems to promise?
In this Article, I will sketch out some of what we know about the
development and operation of the private bureaucratic administration
of the modern plaintiffs' bar. If we begin to recognize the tort system
as a sprawling private bureaucracy with a significant role in American
public policy, at least two interesting points about the operation of the
tort system follow. As a conceptual matter, we might begin to recon2.
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ceptualize the characteristic structure of regulation-by-litigation in the
United States. Perhaps what we have in large swaths of the American
tort system is not Professor Robert Kagan's "adversarial legalism,"
but rather a variation on his European "bureaucratic legalism."' 4 Let's
call this American variation "private bureaucratic legalism," a form of
legalism with considerably fewer adversarial engagements than Kagan's account of American law suggests, and considerably more routinized private processing of claims by agents in ongoing relationships
with one another. Private bureaucratic legalism is not Kagan's adversarial legalism because it is as cooperative as it is adversarial. And it is
not Kagan's European-style bureaucratic legalism because its agents
are private rather than public.
As an institutional and normative matter, it is vitally important that
the administrative apparatus of private bureaucratic legalism be organized to deliver the social policy goods we require from it. And yet
it is not so organized. In the American tort system, we govern the
relationship between tort claimants and their agents with rules of law
that are better suited to a mythical, bygone age of one-on-one lawyerclient representation than to the modern era of mass claims processing. 5 The most prominent proposals for the reform of the lawyer-client relationship in the law of personal injury would only make things
worse by putting awkward and counterproductive caps on market-rate
contingency fees. If we seriously consider the promise of the marketdriven private tort system as a way to achieve certain social policy
goals, however, we ought to think harder about how to make the market in tort settlements, and in particular the market in claimants'-side
legal services, work in concert with our goals-not against them.
II.
A.

THE PROBLEM EXPLAINED

The Development of the Plaintiffs' Bar

The modern American plaintiffs' bar began as an attempt to coordinate the efforts of a still relatively new cadre of administrative lawyers. Workers' compensation statutes enacted across the United
States in the 1910s and 1920s ushered in the administrative state's
public bureaucratic alternative to tort law. The lawyers for claimants
in workers' compensation systems quickly found themselves enmeshed in the interstices of a new kind of statutory and administrative
4. KAGAN, supra note 2, at 3, 11.
5. On the myth of an individualized common law of tort and the inevitability of aggregation
and settlement routinization in the private settlement market, see generally Samuel Issacharoff
& John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An InstitutionalAccount of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004).
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regime. In particular, and, in contradistinction to the tradition in the
common law of torts, benefit rates and claims processing procedures
in the workers' compensation system were set by legislatures, not by
courts. Workers' compensation systems therefore seemed more susceptible than judge-made common law to the kinds of lobbying and
interest group politics that employers' groups, chambers of commerce,
and labor unions had long brought to bear on the political process.
By the mid-1940s, it became clear to leading claimants'-side practitioners that the decentralized and disorganized approach to lawyering
that had been characteristic of the common-law plaintiffs' bar would
no longer suffice under these new conditions. Employers'-side lobbies
sought to reduce benefit levels, which in turn reduced the fees that
claimants' lawyers received from their clients in compensation cases.
Unions fought against such benefit-level decreases, but union interests
in legislatures at the state and federal levels were diffuse and were not
completely aligned with the interests of the claimants' representatives.
And so, in 1946, a small group of claimants'-side workers' compensation lawyers formed an organization called the National Association
of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys (NACCA). The NACCA did
for claimants' lawyers what lobbies and defense-side organizations
had been doing for employers for years in the workers' compensation
system; it fought in the legislature and the state agencies for benefit
rates and other changes in the workers' compensation system. 6
Within just a few short years, however, NACCA leaders realized
that the lobbying and networking they were learning to do in their
workers' compensation practices could be adapted to tort, where it
would be considerably more lucrative. Notwithstanding its commonlaw roots, legislatures had considerable influence over the law of torts.
Moreover, courts were subject to the kinds of interest group politics in
which the NACCA leadership was beginning to participate, especially
at the state level. By 1949, trial lawyers were taking an increasingly
large role in the claimants' compensation lawyers' organization. And
by the early 1950s, the tort lawyers' influence led the organization to
come out against the spread of the workers' compensation model to
other common-law areas, and in favor of its reversal in those areas
where it had replaced the common law. Within just a few short years,
the organization changed its name to the National Association of
Claimants' Counsel of America to deemphasize the worker's compen6.

R. WHITE, DAVID V. GOLIATH: ATLA AND THE FIGHT
1-22, 64 (2004); WIr, supra note 1,at 242; Samuel B. Horovitz, Editorial, NACCA and Its Objectives, 10 NACCA L.J. 17, 28 (1952); J. Harold Land, NACCA Convention, 5 NACCA L.J. 236, 237 (1950).
RICHARD S. JACOBSON & JEFFREY
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sation focus. In 1964, the organization stripped away all traces of its
administrative beginnings and renamed itself the American Trial Lawyers Association, later amended to Association of Trial Lawyers of
7
America (ATLA).
As the plaintiffs' lawyers turned back toward the common law, they
began to articulate a sustained criticism of the administrative state,
especially of those dimensions of the administrative state that
threatened to displace the common law of torts." In Patriotsand Cosmopolitans, I tell the story of how the plaintiffs' bar developed a
powerfully nationalist, often downright xenophobic, campaign on behalf of the common-law traditions of the Anglo-American legal system against ostensibly continental mechanisms of public
administration. With help from opponents of the New Deal state,
early members of the organized plaintiffs' bar described administrative alternatives to the common law as lawless zones of discretionary
managerial authority vested in unaccountable bureaucrats. 9
The switch of the claimants' bar from administration to the common
law was an important, but now largely forgotten, moment in the history of American public policy. It came at the height of the New Deal
state-the moment when public administration apparently triumphed
in American public policy. 10 And it marked the emergence of a new
model for the administration of justice in the modern United States.
Since at least the first decade of the twentieth century, when Roscoe
Pound made famous what he called "sociological jurisprudence," 1
American legal-intellectual elites had argued that the common-law
method of dispute resolution and policymaking, on which the American state had relied heavily since its beginnings, was outmoded in
modern mass society. Central features of the common-law systemits delegation of authority to private parties, its reliance on generalist
judges, its use of lay jurors-made the common law seem vastly inferior to modern methods of public administration. Only public administration seemed capable of bringing to bear the kinds of expertise,
7. JACOBSON & WHITE, supra note 6,at 22, 163-64. As of November 2006, the ATLA has
renamed itself yet again. It will now be known as the American Association for Justice.
8. I describe these critiques more fully in a long chapter of my forthcoming book, Patriotsand
Cosmopolitans. Wrr-r, supra note 1, at 211-78.
9. MELVIN M. BELLI, BLOOD MONEY: READY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 120-26 (1956); Rita Jameson, ATLA, TRIAL, July 1980, at 56; Roscoe Pound, Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331, 340, 346-51 (1938).
10. See generally THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 (Steve Fraser &
Gary Gerstle eds., 1989).
11. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,24 HARv. L. REV.
591 (1911).
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systemic rationality, and public accountability that progressives
12
prized.
The mid-century plaintiffs' bar crafted a new vision for the common
law, a vision of the common law reengineered as a system of justice
for the modern era. In its view, the entrepreneurial"interests of the
plaintiffs' bar supplied a motivating force that promised to overcome
the defects in the common law that Pound and other sociologically
inclined lawyers had identified earlier in the century. An entrepreneurial bar might make the common law into a system of justice
that could work for the individual, even against the giant insurance
companies of the world. To be sure, the lawyer might be "a gladiator
for sale to the highest bidder." But according to the plaintiffs' bar,
this was not so much a flaw in the adversary system as its genius. With
the help of the contingent fee, the gladiator-for-hire might be converted to the service of the wronged individual. The adversary system
thus need not produce the dysfunctions Pound had identified. It
might instead redound to what the plaintiffs' lawyers, rearticulating
the virtues of the common law in the sociologists' aggregate welfarist
' 13
terms, now called "the greatest social benefit.
This was the founding vision of the modern plaintiffs' bar, of the
NACCA, and of the ATLA; it was a vision that was highly critical of
public administration. Ironically, it was also a vision that was crafted
by a much older and greatly changed Pound. Pound had pioneered
the sociological critique of the common law, but by the 1940s and
1950s he had reinvented himself as a critic of the administrative state
and of the New Deal. With Pound's help, the plaintiffs' bar brilliantly
rehabilitated the common law for a modern age. If the plaintiff-sellers
of personal injury claims could find sophisticated lawyers in repeatplay relationships with the defendant-purchasers of claims, plaintiffsellers would have similar economies of scale and as much expertise as
the defendant-purchasers. Thus, the inequality of plaintiffs and defendants in the personal injury field might be resolved by market solutions as well as by publicly administered ones. If lawyers could make
personal injury cases pay, and if they could take advantage of the market opportunities provided by tort law, it seemed to follow that justice

12. Roscoe Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 3 A.B.A. J. 55, 57, 66-69 (1917); see
also Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV. 302,
308-09 (1913).
13. Cf. BELL, supra note 9, at 6. See generally Wrrr, supra note 1, at 211-78.
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could be delivered to the rich and the poor alike without the bureau14
cracies of the administrative state.
In many respects, the early plaintiffs' bar managed brilliantly to
rearticulate the rhetoric and goals of the New Deal state. They did so,
however, in defense of the very institutions (courts, juries, and the
common law) that the New Deal had sought to leave behind. The
language of the early organized plaintiffs' bar often tracked quite
closely the ideas of "economic freedom" that President Franklin
Roosevelt had so powerfully advanced. Similarly, the plaintiffs' bar
made powerful use of the social justice and equality ideals for which
New Deal programs stood. But in the hands of organizations like the
NACCA, these New Deal arguments were now being advanced on
behalf of the courts and the common law-not their New Deal administrative replacements.
B.

Administering the Common Law

Here's where things get tricky. The plaintiffs' bar introduced a new
relationship of relatively unconstrained power that was potentially as
susceptible to abuse as the claimant-bureaucrat relationship of which
the plaintiffs' lawyers were so critical. As the gatekeepers to the tort
settlement system, plaintiffs' lawyers were now repeat players in positions of substantial discretionary authority over their one-shot clients.
In a number of respects, plaintiffs' lawyers in the tort settlement system now had the same kind of power that publicly administered compensation systems had conferred on claims bureaucrats.1"
When I refer to the tort settlement system, I am, of course, hinting
at the well-known predominance of settlement in American tort law,
notwithstanding the occasional but remarkably infrequent tort jury
trial. The classic study by Professors Richard Miller and Austin Sarat
in the late 1970s found that as many as 97% of tort claimants settle
their claims in return for some positive dollar amount. 16 Other studies
put the percentage of claims with positive dollar amounts at somewhat
lower levels, but all agree that tort claims are exceedingly unlikely
14. MELVIN M. BELLI WITH ROBERT BLAIR KAISER, My LIFE ON TRIAL: AN AUTOBIOGRA88 (1976); ROBERT WALLACE, LIFE AND LIMB: AN ACCOUNT OF THE CAREER OF MELVIN
M. BELLI, PERSONAL-INJURY TRIAL LAWYER 125 (1955). See generally WITr, supra note 1, at
211-78.
15. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-101 (1974) [hereinafter Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come out Ahead]. See generally Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5.
16. Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 525, 544 (1980-1981).
PHY
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ever to be tried to a verdict. 17 Indeed, Miller and Sarat found that tort
claims were among the least likely claims to be contested, largely because insurance company claims agents and their repeat-play plaintiffs' representative counterparts had routinized the tort claims
settlement system so effectively.1 8 Today, in areas such as auto accidents, less than 1 % of all claims in the insurance system are tried to a
verdict.' 9
Within the world of settlement, a massive, far-flung system of private administration has arisen; the tort literature has long observed
this phenomenon. Thirty years ago, Professor H. Laurence Ross's
seminal book, Settled out of Court, described in wonderful detail the
way in which the American tort system evolved into private bureaucratic administration. 20 In the automobile accident insurance claims
practice that Ross studied, insurance adjusters working for liability insurance companies resolved tort claims by referring to rules of thumb
and informal grids.
But the significance of Ross's observations has not been sufficiently
appreciated, for they can be generalized a good deal further. As Professor Samuel Issacharoff and I argued in an article published more
than three decades after Ross's initial observations, the rules and grids
are but one example of the process by which areas of American tort
law become routinized into bureaucratic administration. 2' The work
of Professors Howard Erichson, Herbert Kritzer, and Steve Yeazell,
22
among others, has made similar points over the past several years.
In what Issacharoff and I called "mature torts"-torts in which the
law is relatively settled and in which injuries recur in clustered fact
patterns-we claimed that tort practice converges with the practice of
publicly administered systems such as workers' compensation. 23 Both
are organized around bureaucratic administration. Both adopt rules
17. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1212-25 (1992).
18. Miller & Sarat, supra note 16, at 542; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 164 (1986).
19. INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, INJURIES IN AUTO ACCIDENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF AUTO INSURANCE CLAIMS fig.6-16 at 74 (1999).
20. H. LAURENCE RoSs, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1980).
21. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5, at 1605-08.
22. Howard M. Erichson, InformalAggregation: Proceduraland Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 383 (2000); Herbert M. Kritzer,
From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary Cases: Stratification of the
Plaintiffs' Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 219, 228-29 (2001) [hereinafter
Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary Cases]; Stephen C.
Yeazell, Re-financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 199 (2001).
23. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5, at 1573.
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rather than standards to facilitate the claims processing; both construct grids to measure the damages that arise out of routine injuries.
Let's call this the convergence thesis. In tort areas characterized by
the maturity of the underlying law and the regular clustering of fact
patterns, private tort law and public compensation systems converge
along each of these dimensions.
How do the private and public systems converge? One of the central strategies of the modern plaintiffs' bar was the development of
aggregating strategies for the wholesale resolution of claims; this strategy first appeared before the rise of organizations such as the NACCA
and the ATLA. 24 To achieve the kinds of economies of scale and efficiencies that would allow them to compete with defense representatives, the organized plaintiffs' bar worked to develop shortcuts,
negotiation conventions, and other similar strategies.
Aggregating strategies are striking examples of convergence in the
models adopted by public administrators in public compensation systems like workers' compensation. This convergence is especially clear
in some of the pioneering early work of plaintiffs' lawyer Melvin Belli.
The late and decadent phase of Belli's career has obscured his early
creative moments in the late 1940s and 1950s, when Belli and Pound
heralded their new vision for common law in the modern era. Yet
even as Belli championed the trial lawyer as a bulwark against creeping bureaucracy, he was helping to create the institutions and information networks that would allow the plaintiffs' bar to function as a
sprawling, decentralized, and private administrative apparatus.
The key here was providing plaintiffs' lawyers with the same kinds
of information that their insurance adjuster colleagues had. The oncefamous "Belli Seminars," for example, which were typically held in
conjunction with NACCA conferences, created important early educational and information-sharing networks akin to those that are a
mainstay of the ATLA today. 25 Perhaps most importantly, Belli's
massive, multivolume treatise, Modern Damages, collected and disseminated information about claims values that had previously been
available only to insurers and other repeat-play defendants. 26 Modern
Damages compiled damages values from settlements and trials around
the country. This information was absolutely critical if plaintiffs'-side
claims administrators were to be on an equal basis with their insur24. See id. at 1573-74.
25. Ernst W. Bogusch, NACCA Convention, Branches, and Meetings, 11 NACCA L.J. 244. 244
(1953); NACCA Convention and Meetings, 10 NACCA L.J. 284, 284 (1952); Joseph W. Bishop,
Jr., 69 YALE L.J. 925, 929 (1960) (book review),
26. MELVIN M. BELLI, MODERN DAMAGES (1959).
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ance adjuster counterparts. It provided a quick and efficient new way
to arrive at ballpark figures for injury compensation. And its structure-lists of body parts down the left-hand column with dollar values
down the right-resembled nothing more than the kinds of damages
grids used in public compensation schemes like workers' compensation. Even in the decentralized tort system, private claims administrators were compiling detailed lists of injury -values for the processing of
27
injury claims.
Equipped with information about the value of tort claims, plaintiffs'
lawyers in the NACCA were able to turn large swaths of the tort system into decentralized administrative claims systems. As Judge Thurman Arnold long ago observed, there is a sharp divergence between
the public rituals of the American tort system, on one hand, and its
practice, on the other.28 The public face of tort law is the individualized trial: the courtroom, the jury, the appellate opinion, and the
common-law method. The reality of tort law, especially in areas of
tort law that are susceptible to routinized claims handling, is the grinding fact of settlement in private bureaucracies. Thus, along a number
of significant dimensions, the system of private administration in tort
looks similar to the systems of public injury compensation administration with which tort law is typically contrasted. Again and again, studies conclude what Professor Marc Franklin and his colleagues found
when they studied personal injury litigation in the 1950s. Tort law,
they discovered, functioned not as an all-or-nothing lottery, but as a
'29
system of "part-recovery-most-of-the-time.
Consider automobile accidents once again. In recent years, lawyer
participation in the settlement of third-party personal injury claims
involving auto accidents has increased as much as 50%.30 But the
chance that any such claim will produce a lawsuit filed in court has
actually decreased. 3 ' This sounds counterintuitive; more lawyers
might be expected to produce more lawsuits. But this is actually what
we should expect to see when specialist lawyers (or other kinds of
27. See Joseph Bear, NACCA Conventions, 6 NACCA L.J. 212, 214 (1950); NACCA Convention and Officers, 7 NACCA L.J. 232, 236 (1951); Verdicts or Awards Exceeding $50,000, 1
NACCA L.J. 99, 99-100 (1948). See generally MELVIN M. BELLI, SR., THE MORE ADEQUATE
AWARD:

A
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1952 (1952);
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28. Thurman W. Arnold, 40 YALE L.J. 833 (1931) (book review).
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29. Marc A. Franklin et al., Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of
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30. Mark J. Browne & Joan T. Schmit, Patterns in Personal Automobile Third-Party Bodily
Injury Litigation: 1977-1997, at 16 (Sept. 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract-588481.
31. Id.
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specialist claims agents) become increasingly significant. As repeatplay claims representatives become more involved in the claims settlement process, that process will become routinized and streamlined.
Professors Jason Johnston and Joel Waldfogel, for example, found that
as claims representatives develop repeat-play relationships with one
another, the settlement rate and the speed with which claims are resolved increase significantly. 3 2 Regular resort to the courts becomes
less significant-not more. And so in the auto area, somewhere between 70% 33 and 81% 3 4 of third-party personal injury claims are now
resolved in twelve months or less.
C.

Evaluating Private Administration

There are two historical ironies here. The early organization of the
claimants' bar was prompted by the collective action imperatives of
administrative law. The resulting organization then shifted away from
administration toward a new defense of the common law and an attack on the ostensibly unfettered, lawless authority of the bureaucrat
in the administrative state. And yet, in subsequent years, the plaintiffs' bar helped forge a new administrative process, albeit a private
one, in which the bureaucratic processes of the administrative state
have been replicated in the private sphere of the tort claims settlement system. In this system, the claimants' representatives enjoy substantial discretionary authority, not unlike the public claims
processors they once criticized. It is no surprise that studies of the
legal profession have long found that plaintiffs' lawyers are among the
members of the profession with the greatest freedom of action.3 5 Indeed, members of the plaintiffs' bar will concede as much in anony36
mous surveys.
Ironies notwithstanding, there is a good deal to be said for this system of private administration. Plaintiffs' lawyers and defense repre37
sentatives have achieved impressive efficiencies in claims handling.
32. Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? Evidence
from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 59-60 (2002); see also Ronald J. Gilson &
Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in
Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 513 (1994). The~pattern is a long-standing one. See Maurice
Rosenberg & Michael I. Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 1115, 1167 (1959).

33. Browne & Schmit, supra note 30, at 9.
34. INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, fig.7-25 at 102.

35.
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OF THE BAR tbl.4.3 at 103 (1982).
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M.
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37. Johnston & Waldfogel, supra note 32, at 59-60.

UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION
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The private tort system may be more flexible than public compensation programs. With its decentralized system of judges, juries, lawyers, and insurance adjusters, it may also be less susceptible to capture
by well-organized interest groups. Public compensation values are set
by a political process that has proven itself susceptible to dysfunctional interest group politics (witness the steady erosion of workers'
compensation benefits from the 1910s until the early 1970s). The
damages values in tort law's private administration system, by contrast, filter down the dispute pyramid to recalibrate the going rate for
the private settlement system. They are continuously tested and
retested in courtrooms, which serve as price coordinators for the private administration of claims. 38
In addition, while it is true that the aggregation strategy of the tort
claims administration may be in tension with the rhetoric of the common law and its individualized methods, it is not at all clear, at least in
the first instance, that the aggregating strategies of the plaintiffs' bar
are a bad thing. To be sure, many aggregation strategies seem to be
inconsistent with the traditional individualized canons of the profession's ethical codes because they take the plaintiff-clients as a class
rather than as individual claimants. 39 Aggregate settlement strategies
adopt rules of thumb to minimize the administrative costs of tort claim
settlements. From an ex post perspective, some plaintiffs would undoubtedly do better under an individualized approach. Others would
do worse. But ex ante, there is no telling on which side any one prospective claimant in the system will fall. 40 And so, from behind the
veil of ignorance, prospective tort claimants should prefer to increase
the size of the settlement pie that is achieved by adopting the efficiencies of aggregation, even if it means trading away individualized inquiry into the particular facts and circumstances of their injuries.
Furthermore, while the early leaders of the plaintiffs' bar identified
the discretionary authority of the public claims bureaucrat as especially dangerous, there are market mechanisms in place that significantly constrain the discretion of the plaintiffs' representative. As we
will see in a moment, these constraints are not effective along all
dimensions, but they are not insignificant. In particular, even as Belli
and the early leaders of the NACCA were creating the modern plain38. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5, at 1612.
39. Erichson, supra note 22, at 445-46.
40. Even viewed ex post, many of the factors that would be advantageous to certain claimants
in an individualized system are likely to be morally irrelevant ones. The American tort system
seems to return higher damages on bases such as sex, race, charisma, beauty, and numerous
other morally irrelevant dimensions. To the extent that these factors are averaged out in aggregating settlement strategies, such averaging may be a virtue rather than a vice viewed ex post.
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tiffs' bar, one governance feature of the attorney-client relationship
was already in place that aligned many of the interests of the plaintiffs' personal injury lawyer with the client-the contingency fee.
In the personal injury area, the contingent fee is far and away the
predominant fee arrangement. In a number of respects, the contingent fee functions nicely to align the interests of repeat-play lawyers
and one-shot clients. Clients need not worry about their inability to
monitor or evaluate the conduct of their counsel, nor about the information asymmetries that make them vulnerable, because the contingent fee provides their counsel with powerful incentives to advance
their interests.
To be sure, the contingent fee does not align interests completely.
In particular, as Professors Kritzer, Jack Coffee, Geoffrey Miller, and
others have shown, the contingency fee does not completely close the
gap between the interests of the lawyer and the interests of the client. 41 The client's interests are in maximizing the total value of the
claim. The lawyer's interests are in maximizing the implicit hourly
wage. It follows that plaintiffs' representatives have powerful incentives to settle cases early in the process, before they have invested
many hours in the claim, even if this means settling at a lower claim
value.
Even so, the misaligned interests of the lawyer and the client under
contingency fee arrangements have been mitigated by two developments in the market for plaintiffs' legal services. The first development consists of escalating sliding scale fees, in which the lawyer's
share of the damages increases as the case proceeds from settlement
discussions to trial to appeal. 42 Upwardly sliding fee scales are relatively imprecise ways of aligning interests with respect to the duration
of litigation, but they are better than straight contingencies.
A second development in the market for plaintiffs' legal services
appears to have significantly mitigated the skewed incentives of plaintiffs' counsel in this area. Among the most striking features of the
plaintiffs' bar to emerge from the remarkably interesting and still-developing sociological literature on plaintiffs' lawyering is its heavy reli41. HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION
156-57 (1990) [hereinafter KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding
the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669. 686-89 (1986); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189 (1987).
42. Such upwardly graded fee arrangements have been around for some time. See Proceedings, 1929 PROCEEDINGS ST. B. ASs'N Wis. 200; see also F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES
FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPONSIBILITIES app. at
218-19 (1964).
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ance on thick systems of referral networks for a steady supply of cases.
There are two different systems of referral networks at work in the
personal injury bar. At the lower end of the plaintiffs' bar, the domi43
nant source of clients is referrals by past clients.
The second, and increasingly important, referral network runs not
from past clients to lawyers, but from lawyers to lawyers. The breadth
of the lawyer-to-lawyer referral system is especially striking in the
study of Sara Parikh on Chicago and the study of Stephen Daniels and
Joanne Martin on Texas. 44 Lower-echelon lawyers refer big, complex,
and expensive cases up the chain to high-end elite lawyers, who in
turn refer simpler cases back down to the lower-echelon lawyers.
Generalist lawyers refer cases to specialists; specialists in one area refer cases to specialists in other areas-and so on.
The results of referral networks are twofold. First, a robust lawyerto-lawyer referral network means that claimants are much less likely
to have their claim values reduced because they chose a bad lawyer.
As Yeazell has observed, the modern referral system means that "a
plausible claim is quite likely to get into the hands of a competent
lawyer who can invest the amount necessary to reach a good result for
the client."' 45 Second, both the lawyer-to-lawyer referral networks and
the networks of past clients present superb market solutions to the
skewed incentives of plaintiffs' counsel to settle low rather than go to
trial. In both of these systems, a lawyer's reputation matters immensely. Lawyers who hope for future referrals from their past clients have a powerful reputational interest in ensuring client
satisfaction, even among one-shot clients such as those in personal in46
jury cases.
Lawyers who hope for future referrals from other lawyers have perhaps an even stronger reputational interest in ensuring the satisfaction
43.

CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRAC-ICINo LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND

SMALL-FIRM AT-ORNEYS 53 (1996); see also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "It's Darwin-

ism-Survival of the Fittest": How Markets and Reputations Shape the Ways in Which Plaintiffs'
Lawyers Obtain Clients, 21 LAW & POL'Y 377, 385 (1999). But see Kritzer, From Litigators of
Ordinary Cases to Litigators of ExtraordinaryCases, supra note 22, at 225; Jerry Van Hoy, Markets and Contingency: How Client Markets Influence the Work of Plaintiffs' PersonalInjury Lawyers, 6 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 345, 358-59 (1999).

44. Sara Parikh, Professionalism and Its Discontents: A Study of Social Networks in the
Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Bar 119-20 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago); Daniels & Martin, supra note 43, at 381; see also Kritzer, From Litigators of
Ordinary Cases to Litigators of ExtraordinaryCases, supra note 22, at 225; Yeazell, supra note
22, at 199-203.
45. Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1996 (2004).
46. Lynn Mather, What Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1065, 1077

(2003).
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of the referring lawyer. Referring lawyers retain a cut of the contingent fee in return for the referral, typically one-third of the fee. This
referral fee neatly solves the contingency fee misalignment problem in
the asymmetric relationship between the repeat-play lawyer and the
one-shot personal injury client. Now another repeat player, the referring lawyer, has an interest in maximizing the value of the claim, and
the referring lawyer has no implicit hourly wage calculation because
the work is typically finished after the referral itself. Among repeatplay referring and receiving lawyers, the reputational interests of receiving lawyers in maintaining the relationships that supply them with
cases substantially mitigates the misalignment of interests that would
47
otherwise systematically lower claim values.
Together, then, contingency fees and referral networks effectively
work to maximize claim value. Here, at least, the discretionary authority of the plaintiffs' bar cannot be said to be unconstrained.
And yet from a public design perspective, the informal rules of the
private tort settlement system are highly unsatisfactory. Plaintiffs may
rest easy that their claims representatives are well incentivized to
maximize the value of their claim within the rules of the administrative matrix, but the rules of that matrix are almost completely opaque.
They are virtually invisible, rarely articulated, and usually unreviewable. They do not produce information about their operation. They
have nothing approaching a notice-and-comment period of the sort we
require for public administrative rulemaking. 48 And their creators are
49
unaccountable to any democratically authorized body.
To be sure, the rules of the administrative system are roughly tied to
the likely outcomes at trial by their very nature. But like the expected
jury outcomes on which they are based, the informal settlement system rules may be replete with illicit 'mechanisms that would be unacceptable in a publicly accountable and transparent system. Examples
might include differential claims values on the basis of race 50 or sex, 5'
or higher claims values as a share of total damages for claimants with
47.

HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS:

PRACTICE IN THE UNITED

STATES

CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL

58-61 (2004); see. also Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee

Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement Realities, and Issues of Control in
the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 795, 799 (1998) [hereinafter Kritzer,
Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients].

48. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000).
49. See generally REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
50. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900-1949, 49 How. L.J. 99

(2005).
51. Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation
of Economic Loss, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1435 (2005).
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slight injuries than for claimants with serious ones. 52 Another welldocumented dysfunction in the private settlement system is the problem that arises in areas such as asbestos injuries, when the interests of
present and future claimants in the system conflict. The future claimants, of course, have found themselves unrepresented in a system that
relies on representation and the market interests of the representa53
tives. Future claimants' interests have suffered accordingly.
We have reason to believe that each of these features is characteristic of the way the private tort settlement system functions. Given the
paucity of information available, it is virtually impossible to be sure,
but that is the point: the private administrative system, unlike its public compensation alternatives, systematically shields itself from review
54
by making information collection extremely cumbersome.
The substantial and often virtually unconstrained discretionary authority of claimants' representatives in the claims system is perhaps
most visible in package or aggregate settlements. In that kind of settlement, a defendant settles two or more cases with a single claimants'
representative for a lump sum, leaving it to the claimants' representa55
tive to allocate settlement dollars among the group of claimants. It
may well be that the economies of scale offered by representing multiple claimants create savings that could be passed along to the group
members. If so, it stands to reason that from the ex ante position,
behind the veil of ignorance, prospective group members might
choose to allow some kinds of aggregate settlements, just as they
might choose to authorize any number of aggregating, surplus-creating strategies in the settlement system. 56 And yet what is striking
about the aggregate or package settlement in the tort claims system is
how unfettered the discretionary authority of the claimants' representative is. Vesting broad discretion to allocate settlement funds in the
hands of the claimants' lawyer creates a significant risk of arbitrary

52. Saks. supra note 17, at 1217-18.
53. Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies,
98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1435. 1436 (2004).
54. Cf. Saks, supra note 17, at 1154-68.
55. Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465 (1998) [hereinafter Silver & Baker, Plaintiffs'
Counsel].

56. Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, The Aggregate Settlement Rule and Ideals of Client Service, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 241-42 (1999); Silver & Baker, Plaintiffs' Counsel, supra note 55, at
1496-97: Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32
WAKE FORESTr L. REV. 733. 744-45 (1997).
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allocations, or more likely, allocations that maximize the claimants'
57
lawyer's fee rather than the interests of the claimants.
D. Private Administration and the Legal Fees Market
It is worth asking whether the savings from the economies that
plaintiffs' lawyers achieve in the administrative settlement system are
shared with the claimants. This brings us to one of the most important
distinctions to be drawn between public and private compensation systems: public compensation systems often seem considerably less expensive to operate than their private tort alternatives. As leading
figures in the torts literature have reminded us for the better part of a
century, the virtues of tort law are enormously expensive.5 8 The going
rate for plaintiffs'-side legal services is typically one-third of the damages or settlement value, and sometimes it is closer to one-half of the
claim value. When one adds in the defense costs and the public administrative burdens, the costs of administering the tort system are
typically said to amount to somewhere between fifty and sixty cents
for every dollar delivered to injury victims. 59 It is a shockingly high
cost, one that has soured many on the private alternative to public
administration that the plaintiffs' bar crafted a half century ago.
There is good reason to think that the savings from these aggregating strategies are not passed on to the claimants themselves, and in my
view this is probably the most acute instance in which the plaintiffs'
bar has proven all too resistant to constraint by either market or law.
Does the cost of the tort system, and in particular the costs of plaintiffs'-side legal services, have to be so great? Are there ways to design
the tort settlement market so as to capture the benefits that markets
deliver without the costs that this particular market seems to have
brought with it? To answer these questions, we should identify the
characteristics of the plaintiffs' side of the tort settlement system.
57. Cf. Erichson, supra note 22, at 388 n.7. The settling lawyer may have different interests in
the claims of a group of clients if, for example, the lawyer owes a referral fee for some clients but
not others.
58. ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 69-71, 228-29 (1965); Alfred F.

Conard, The Impact of Expense on Injury Claims, 287 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 110,

119 (1953); see also Fleming James, Jr., Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial
Process, 8 BUFF. L. REV. 315, 328-33 (1959): cf John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and
Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478, 1536-37 (1966): Fleming James, Jr., Social

Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 537
(1952).
59. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION 70 (1986).
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Contingency Fees

As I noted above, the predominant fee arrangement in personal injury litigation is the contingency fee, which functions to partially align
the interests of the claimant and the claimant's representative.
Though the contingency fee rates have changed somewhat over time,
mostly decreasing, they have been the standard claimants'-side personal injury fee arrangement for 'as long as 150 years in American tort
60
law.
2.

Repeat-Players Versus One-Shotters

Further, the demand side of the equation-the consumers of plaintiffs'-side services-is made up of one-shot players. The supply side,
by contrast, consists of repeat-play personal injury lawyers. 61 There
are, of course, numerous important transactions in the course of people's lives in which the commercial relationships take this form. Think
of real estate transactions, for example, or automobile sales, or life
insurance policies. But the problem is especially acute in the market
for legal services because consumers are highly unlikely to ever have
entered the market before, and will rarely know more than one or two
people who have.
3.

Information Asymmetries,

Because of the one-shot, repeat-play structure of the client-lawyer
relationship in the personal injury context, information asymmetries
are pervasive. 62 Consumer-clients cannot be expected to know much
about the proper course of litigation. They are thus poorly positioned
to monitor a lawyer's performance or evaluate a settlement offer.
More importantly, consumer-clients are also poorly positioned to have
information that would allow them to differentiate among plaintiffs'
lawyers on the front end of the legal services market when choosing a
lawyer. Indeed, in many respects, claimants' legal services in the personal injury area are what economists call "credence goods": goods or
60. Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 457, 469-70 (1998) [hereinafter Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down
a Manhole].
61. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead, supra note 15, at 97.

62. As Professor Michael Abramowicz and others have noted, there are information asymmetries that run the other way as well. Because personal injury claimants have private information
about the character of their injuries and the circumstances out of which those injuries arose, we
should see limits on the alienation of tort claims by victim-sellers to third-party buyers, even
where those third-party buyers would be better positioned to finance the claims and achieve
economies of scale in the litigation process. Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal
Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 737 (2005).
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services provided by a seller or provider of services "who also deter'63
mines the buyer's needs.
Surprisingly, in the personal injury context on the claimants' side,
none of this may matter very much for the quality of the legal services
likely to be provided. For reasons we have seen, the contingent fee
combined with referral networks should take care of that. But lack of
market information turns out to matter a whole lot for the price the
consumer-client pays in the marketplace.
4. Price Stickiness
As critics of the contingency fee like to point out, the price of the
plaintiffs'-side legal services in personal injury cases is relatively constant at about one-third of the total damages or settlement value.
Most plaintiffs' lawyers charge a flat contingency fee of about onethird of the total damages or settlement value and, while some plaintiffs' lawyers offer a sliding scale fee arrangement, such arrangements
often yield fees close to this same one-third portion. 64 The contingency fee was once higher. Until investigations and hearings on plaintiffs'-side legal fees in the middle of the twentieth century, early
plaintiffs' lawyers' contingency fees were typically closer to one-half
of the total damages or settlement value. 65 But since then, and despite some limited evidence of price competition in the plaintiffs' market, the price term in plaintiffs'-side personal injury retainers is
66
remarkably sticky at around the one-third point.
There are many possible explanations for the standardization of
contingency fees. Critics, for example, describe the bar as an anticompetitive cartel extracting monopoly rents. 6 7 Others chalk up the standard contingency fee to path-dependence and tradition. But one of
the relevant factors inhibiting price competition is almost certainly the
63. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MiCt. L. REV. 953, 968 (2000).
64. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 286-87 (1998); see also Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients,
supra note 47, at 809 (noting that some lawyers may employ sliding scale arrangements not
because they are engaging in price competition, but because they want to be able to use the

threat of rising fees to convince clients to accept settlement offers).
65. MAcKINNON, supra note 42, at 139 n.16 (citing Wasservogel, Report, Findings and Recommendations in the Matter of the HearingOrdered by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
in and for the First and Second Judicial Departments Regarding a Proposed Rule to Limit Compensation of Plaintiffs' Attorneys in PersonalInjury and Wrongful Death Actions, N.Y.L.J., Sept.

9, 1955, at 38-39).
66. Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole, supra note 60, at 468-73.
67. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell et al., Yellow Page Ads as Evidence of Widespread Overcharging by the Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Bar-And a Proposed Solution, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 423

(1999-2000).
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information deficits that potential customer-clients face when they
enter the market for claims administration. Precisely because the private settlement system is virtually invisible (sometimes invisibility is
even built into the settlement through gag order clauses), credible information about the past performance of the lawyer or lawyers with
whom the potential client-customer is contemplating a relationship is
very difficult to come by. In such a setting, we should expect to see
more price stickiness than elsewhere. Suppliers of legal services will
shy away from cutting their rates so as not to send signals that might
suggest that the quality of their services is below average, and consumers of legal services will be reluctant to pay premiums for highquality legal services when the information required to comparison
68
shop is unavailable.
5.

Competition and the Queuing Effect

Notwithstanding the price stickiness in plaintiffs'-side personal injury legal services markets, close observers have noted that there is
significant and often cutthroat competition in the plaintiffs' bar.
Rather than reduce their rates, plaintiffs' lawyers compete for clients-specifically, they compete with one another for clients with easy
69
cases or valuable claims.
In turn, claimants often compete with one another to retain the services of well-known lawyers. This is the queuing effect that Professor
Robert Mnookin has observed in the market for plaintiffs'-side claims
administration. 70 As Mnookin points out, high-quality claims assistance providers do not raise their rates, they simply cherry pick their
cases. Would-be clients line up outside the doors of the very best lawyers, who are then able to select the highest-yield cases from the mix.
Among other things, this phenomenon has the perverse effect of encouraging the best service providers to take the cases that will most
easily yield the highest value. As a consequence, the harder cases may
often fall to the middle or lower ranks of lawyers, precisely because
their difficulty reduces their likely yield. As Mnookin explains, the
result is that the best lawyers do not select the cases to which they
might be able to add the most value. 7 1
68. See Rudy Santore & Alan D. Viard, Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney
Rents, 44 J.L. & ECON. 549 (2001).
69. On competition in the plaintiffs' bar, see Parikh, supra note 44, at 60 and Charles Silver,
Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2086-93 (2002).
70. Robert H. Mnookin, Negotiation, Settlement and the Contingent Fee, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
363. 368 (1998).
71. Id. at 369.
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6.

Thick Referral Networks

As we have already seen, the system of referral networks among
repeat-play plaintiffs' lawyers functions nicely to minimize the remaining gaps between the interests of the claimant and the claimant's
72
representative that the contingency fee does not close.
Interestingly, a relatively small number of disputes appear to occur
among lawyers over referral fees. There is some such infighting, to be
sure, but the lawyers who specialize in personal injury cases are not
known to be a cooperative bunch. 73 Their capacity to get along in
referral networks is a clue to one further feature of the market for
plaintiffs'-side claims administration that I have not yet mentioned.
Sticky contingency fee pricing may also be relatively uncompetitive
pricing that generates supramarginal fees. The rents from uncompetitive markets may be just enough to grease the wheels of the referral
system and minimize the referral fee conflict. This shows the extent to
which the private settlement market has failed to pass along the efficiencies of aggregation to the claimants themselves.
III.

TOWARD A SOLUTION:

IMPROVING THE MARKET

FOR PRIVATE ADMINISTRATION

A.

The Perversity of Contingency Fee Price Controls

The public debate over contingency fees immediately suggests a solution to the problem of uncompetitive rates. We could simply cap
contingency fees, and in some areas of American tort law, such as
medical malpractice, a number of jurisdictions already have. Under
the California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA)
enacted in 1975, attorney's fees are capped at 40% of the first $50,000
recovered, 33 1/3% of the next $50,000, 25% of the next $500,000, and
15% of anything over $600,000. 7 4 Such limits mean the loss of big
money. A recent RAND Corporation study found that this fee limitation has cost plaintiffs' lawyers in California some $17 million each
year. This figure does not even include the cases that were not
brought because of MICRA, or cases that were settled in its shadow
for a fraction of what they would have received in a world without
75
caps on damages.
72. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients, supra note 47, at 799.
73. Cf. Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole, supra note 60, at 471-72.
74. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003).

75. See generally NICHOLAS
MALPRACFiCE TRIALS:

M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL

CALIFORNIA JURY VERDIC[S UNDER

MICRA (2004).
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But as even some of the most vociferous critics of plaintiffs' bar fee
arrangements have observed, caps on contingency fees are a perverse
and cumbersome mechanism for regulating prices in the personal injury legal services market. 76 Like price controls in most markets, fee
caps are likely to generate all kinds of dysfunctions. They are likely to
leave the hardest cases, the ones in which the pre-cap contingency fees
were more or less what the competitive market would have generated,
unserved by the bar. Moreover, fee caps such as the one in MICRA
that decline as the settlement or damages values increase are especially perverse. Remember my discussion of the agency problem that
arises in contingency fee settings between lawyers seeking to maximize implicit hourly wages and clients seeking to maximize claims values. The MICRA diminishing scale cap exacerbates the problem by
further minimizing the claimants' representative's incentive to maximize claim value. Increased claims values produce ever smaller returns under MICRA, and the result is diminished incentives to put
time into a claim, even where that time would increase the total claim
value.
B.

The Limits of Legal Rules

The limitations of fee cap rules are symptomatic of the broader limits facing rules of law in this area. The ethics canons and codes of the
organized bar, its disciplinary mechanisms, and the supervisory role of
the courts are likely to be too unwieldy to provide meaningful constraints on the pricing of plaintiffs'-market legal services. We have
gained fifty years of experience since the last significant efforts by the
bar to reduce the contingent fees of the plaintiffs' bar. The lesson of
time is that these long-standing mechanisms of governance are unlikely to deliver the kind of oversight needed. This should hardly be
surprising, given the market into which the traditional professional apparatus seeks to intervene. The almost entirely private system of settlements, in which repeat-play lawyers represent one-shot claimants, is
one that is extremely poorly suited for a rule-of-law command approach to governing the lawyer-client relationship.
C.
I am relatively
to constrain the
much to improve
the agency costs

The Rule-of-the-Market Alternative
unpersuaded that a new focus on using rules of law
plaintiffs' agents in the settlement process will do
the functioning of the legal services market or lower
personal injury law currently entails. The institu-

76. Hadfield, supra note 63, at 1003.
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tional context of legal rules governing the professional conduct of the
plaintiffs' representatives is simply not well suited to the regular and
reliable use of new ethical injunctions or command-and-control rules
for contingency fee rates.
Although rule of law constraints are unlikely to be effective here,
redesigning the market for plaintiffs'-side legal services seems quite
promising. As Professor David Wilkins has reminded us, canons of
legal ethics and professional norms are only some of the tools that
govern lawyers. 77 To quote Professor Charlie Silver's characteristically blunt way of making this point, "A good incentive structure... is
worth a pick-up load of ...disciplinary rules."' 78 Where I come from,
we are more likely to talk about taxicab trunks than pick-up truck
beds, but the point seems to hold true across jurisdictions. Market
mechanisms can function effectively in the same decentralized contexts that defeat command-and-control rules of professional conduct.
The difficulty in the market for plaintiffs'-side legal services, however, is that the information asymmetries are drastic. There is virtually no way for a potential claimant to choose sensibly among lawyers
competing for a claim. To be sure, there is relatively little price competition outside of niche markets such as aviation disaster claims.
And in this regard, the potential claimant has little to go on. But even
if there were price competition, a potential claimant would have little
way of making sense of the choices because of the extreme difficulty
of evaluating the quality of the legal services being offered. In a world
in which the quality of the services is opaque to the consumer, price
79
cutting merely sends signals that the quality of services will be low.
In some respects, as we saw earlier, the inability of potential claimants to distinguish high-quality legal services providers from low-quality ones no longer matters as much as it once did. The dense network
of lawyer referrals means that cases are likely to be channeled to lawyers in a good position to maximize their claim value, even where the
case began in the office of a lawyer not in such a position. But the
referral network does not constrain the price term of the lawyer-client
relationship. Indeed, there is some reason to think that the uncompetitive market in contingency fee arrangements has helped to grease
the wheels of the referral market. So what can be done? In other
areas that rely on private mechanisms to deliver important social policy goods, the legal regime has focused on flushing out the information
77. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990).
78. Charles Silver, Professional Liability Insurance as Insurance and as Lawyer Regulation:
Response to Davis, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 242 (1996).

79. Santore & Viard, supra note 68, at 550.
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that allows markets to work. Securities markets are the classic
example.
The problem is that attorney-client privilege rules make it exceedingly difficult for any would-be claimant to obtain such information.
We could try to collect systematic information on claims values
through lawyer self-reporting. In limited local studies, such self-reporting has yielded valuable information about the functioning of the
tort system.80 But to my knowledge, it has never been used to evaluate the performance of the lawyers who did the reporting, and if it
were so used, the quality of the reporting would be highly suspect.
Developing a mechanism for auditing self-reporting would be prohibitively costly and virtually impossible given lawyer-client confidentiality rules.
D.

Claims Brokers and the False Start of Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia

If information is the critical missing ingredient in the market for
legal services, and if self-reporting is unreliable and difficult to police,
are there other ways to create a richer information environment?
The history of personal injury practice suggests just such a mechanism. Wherever routine, repetitive tort claims have appeared, lay
claims brokers have arisen to connect the claimant with the legal system. The well-known Frank McCloskey ran a railroad claims brokerage business in Texas in the 1910s and 1920s. 8 1 Polish translators
served as the go-betweens for work-related injuries in the Massachusetts textile mills of the 1890s, 82 and Russian claims agents brokered
personal injury claims in Wisconsin in the 1920s for another immigrant
population.8 3 Both sets of middlemen-brokers, interestingly enough,
seem to have been paid by their claimant clients and also by the indus84
trial defendants for whom they provided peace and claim resolution.
More formally, labor unions,8 5 automobile owner associations,8 6 and
other voluntary organizations had sought to develop legal services
plans that streamline and reduce the cost of legal services for their
80. See, e.g., Rosenberg & Sovern, supra note 32.
81. Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329,
342-43 (1987).
82. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5, at 1592.
83. Proceedings. supra note 42.
84. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5, at 1593; Proceedings, supra note 42, at 343-44.
85. See generally George E. Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case for BRT, 12 UCLA L.
REV. 306 (1965).

86. Quintin Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among Power
Groups, 4 U. KAN. L. REV. 1. 14 (1955).
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members. In the 1920s, so-called independent claims adjusters sprung
up in California to provide auto accident victims with the same kinds
of claims representation that insurance companies received from their
defense-side claims adjusters. 87 In short, lay claims brokers have appeared wherever tort law has created repetitive and routinized claims
to fill the market niche created by claimants' lack of information
about legal services and the law. 88
These lay intermediaries, of course, have been the object of heated
attacks and criticisms by the legal profession from the very beginnings
of American tort law to the present. 89 But the resistance of the legal
profession seems motivated, in large part, by the threat that lay middlemen and brokers pose to lawyers' monopoly over the provision of
legal services. What the middlemen promised their claimant clients
was a way to collect and utilize information about the lawyers in the
marketplace. Claims brokers offered the services of a knowledgeable
intermediary who had good information about the quality of lawyers
in the area and whose goodwill the lawyers were anxious to retain.
A closer look at two examples of claims brokerage in the personal
injury area may illustrate what claims brokers can do. The first example is drawn from the early history of the claims system, and its lost
promise may hold the seeds of a solution to the failures of the personal injury legal services market. The second example, drawn from
our own time, is a sign of the dysfunction of the legal services market
today.
The functional example is the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen's
legal counsel plan, which was at its height around the middle of the
twentieth century. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (BRT)
first developed its legal counsel plan in 1930, when it established a
Legal Aid Department in response to decades of complaints by members about the difficulty of identifying high-quality legal services at
reasonable rates. 90 The Department served as a union-wide clearinghouse for information about accidents and accident claims. It conducted its own preliminary investigations of accidents involving injury
to one or more of its members; it then connected its injured members
87. Corinne Lathrop Gilb, Self-Regulating Professions and the Public Welfare: A Case Study
of the California State Bar 233 (1956) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Radcliffe College).
88. Proceedings,supra note 42, at 343-44.
89. See, e.g., Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences
Really Make Good Neighbors-Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159; Gilb,

supra note 87, at 234.
90. Bodle, supra note 85, at 309-10.
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to participating lawyers who represented members in injury claims
against the railroads. 91
The goals of the Department were twofold. First, it sought to alleviate what one observer has called "the hatpin-method" of selecting an
attorney at random from the phonebook. 92 In the era before modern
referral networks made it increasingly likely that claims would make
their way to a value-maximizing lawyer, the BRT's lawyer identification service was exceedingly important. By collecting and organizing
information about lawyer performance, the Department would allow
its members to make sensible decisions in the legal services market.
Second, the Department reduced the contingency fee rates that participating lawyers charged BRT members, from between 33% and 50%,
to between 20% and 25%. 93 To this day, the descendent organization
of the BRT coordinates the identification of legal services for injured
94
railroad worker members.
The second, and dysfunctional, example of claims brokerage is the
kind of brokering that is more often the paradigmatic form of claims
brokering in our own time: the lawyer-organized claims mill. Many
lawyers who advertise as personal injury specialists are little more
than referral mills. They serve as intake offices for claims that they
then farm out to specialized lawyers in return for a contingent referral
fee. 9 5 In the process, lawyer claims mills effectively get cases into the
hands of specialized, high-value-added lawyers. But they put no pressure at all on fees. Quite the contrary, they seem to thrive in an uncompetitive legal fees market that sometimes functions a little like a
gold rush-locating and signing up clients is the key. Such client prospectors function as a tax on actual legal services providers, whose fees
96
are discounted by the claims mill referral fee.
Perhaps the most striking thing about these two different systems of
claims brokerages-one union-organized, one lawyer-operated-is
that the limits of one and the defects of the other seem to arise out of
the same regulatory problem: the legal profession's rules against referral fees for nonlawyers. The lawyer-run claims mills operate in an
91. Id.
92. Id. at 323.
93. Id. at 311.
94. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, The Federal Employees Liability Act, http://www.ble.org/fela/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
95. Daniels & Martin, supra note 43, at 390; Van Hoy, supra note 43, at 347.
96. Andrew Blum, Big Bucks, but... , NAT'L L.J., Apr. 3, 1989, at 1 (noting that a prominent
personal injury firm pays 28% of its fee revenue to referring lawyers); State Tax Tribunal Rules
Against Law Firm on Withholding for Referrals by Associates, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 3, 2003, at 21 (noting that a prominent plaintiffs'-side firm regularly pays 50% referral fees).
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environment of starkly restricted competition. Under the American
Bar Association's professional ethics provisions, lawyers may not pay
referral fees to nonlawyers. 97 Nonlawyers, in turn, risk prosecution
for the unauthorized practice of law for claims brokerage. It is little
wonder, then, that the lawyer claims mills have put so little pressure
on fees.
As for the BRT's legal services plan, its chief shortcoming was that
these same limits on nonlawyer claims brokering prevented it from
collecting and organizing information in a way that would allow members to make effective decisions in the legal services marketplace. We
can infer this in part from the standardized 25% contingency fee arrangement that emerged in the BRT program's heyday.98 The price
variation that one would expect to see in a market in which there was
considerably more information about the quality of the services being
offered did not develop.
The reason for the limits of the BRT program seems quite simple.
As a labor union, the BRT was forbidden from committing the kind of
resources to the program that the collection and organization of the
relevant information would have required. At first, it appears, the
BRT tried to do precisely this. In the early 1930s, the BRT itself took
5% or 6% of each claim's ultimate value as a contingent fee. 99 This
cut of the proceeds might have become the mechanism by which the
BRT financed a systematic body of information on lawyer performance for its members. But within just a few short years, railroad employer organizations and bar associations led a successful attack on
the BRT plan's early business model. In states around the country,
participating lawyers were charged with disciplinary violations of the
rules of professional ethics for accepting paid referrals. 10 0 By 1960, it
was relatively well settled that although professional norms permitted
a labor organization such as the BRT to identify lawyers for its injured
members, the practice of referral fees paid to the labor organization
constituted a violation of lawyers' professional ethics, as well as illegal

97. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2 (2006).
98. Bodle, supra note 85, at 311.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 313-17 (noting that lawyers were charged with violating Canons 28 and 35 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics); see, e.g., In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933) (per
curiam); Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 225 P.2d 508 (Cal. 1950) (per curiam); Hulse v. Bhd. of
R.R. Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1960) (en banc); State ex rel. Beck v. Lush, 103 N.W.2d 136
(Neb. 1960).
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solicitation of lawsuits by the labor organization and the unauthorized
practice of law. 1 1
This compromise was the arrangement that the Supreme Court upheld in its well-known 1964 decision, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar. 0 2 The Railroad Trainmen
case began in the civil rights battles of the 1950s. In an attempt to foil
the NAACP's civil rights litigation campaign in the South, the Virginia
legislature in 1956 expanded the state's definition of the illegal solicitation of legal business. In 1963, in NAACP v. Button, the Supreme
Court struck down an injunction against the NAACP litigators on the
grounds that the First Amendment protected the organization's right
to organize its campaign in the courts.1 0 3 A year later, the Court did
the same for a similar Virginia injunction against the BRT, extending
the First Amendment principle from the civil rights cases to the labor
104
union and personal injury context.
The decision in Railroad Trainmen is typically hailed as a robust
defense of the BRT's legal services plan. 10 5 In retrospect, however,
the limitations of the Railroad Trainmen decision are just as salient as
its virtues. The Railroad Trainmen decision suggested strongly that if
the BRT had sought to take referral fees or retain a stake in the
claim-the kinds of steps that might have allowed it to recoup its
costs-the case would have been very different. The Court's First
Amendment rationale thus emphasized the cooperative and associational aspects of the BRT's legal services plan. The Court concluded
06
that the plan was "not a commercialization of the legal profession."'
Seven years later, in another railway union legal services case, the
Court quietly made it clear that it would uphold ethics rules barring
07
referral fees and fee sharing with nonlawyers.1
The Court's disdain for commercialization was evident. It indicates
that the Court decided the union legal services cases on the basis of a
rights framework that it drew from the related civil rights battles of
the Button case. Or perhaps the Court was misled by the individual
rights rhetoric of the plaintiffs' bar in its founding years. 10 8 But in
101. Bodle, supra note 85. at 316-17; see also In re Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 150 N.E.2d 163 (I11.
1958); Ryan v. Pa. R.R., 268 I11.
App. 364 (App. Ct. 1932).
102. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
103. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
104. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 7-8.
105. See Bodle, supra note 85, at 322; see also Yeazell, supra note 45, at 1976, 1988 (describing
the significance of Button and Railroad Trainmen for the transformation of civil litigation).
106. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 6.
107. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 582-84 (1971).
108. See Wr-, supra note 1, at 211-78.

2007]

PRIVATE BUREAUCRATIC LEGALISM

retrospect, the First Amendment framework adopted by the Court
sent the law of lay claims brokers down a blind alley. For what the
Railroad Trainmen case ought to have been about was not associational rights so much as the effective delivery of legal advice in the
legal services market. Even as the Court recognized new rights in the
legal services area, the plaintiffs' bar was quickly turning the provision
of legal services in the personal injury area into a powerful but deeply
flawed market, one that the First Amendment regime of the Railroad
Trainmen case had little hope of successfully organizing.
To be sure, after the Railroad Trainmen case, lay organizations such
as labor unions have a formal First Amendment right to associate
their members with participating lawyers. But legal ethics rules bar
them from taking the steps that would allow them to do so effectively.
Indeed, were large organizations such as labor unions allowed to develop a financial stake in litigation, there is good reason to think that
the price of legal services in the personal injury market might become
considerably more competitive. Organizations sufficiently large to
collect and organize information about the legal services performed
would be in a good position to turn their members into effective
agents in the legal services marketplace. 0 9
An effective system of lay brokers would probably not even require
preexisting organizations such as labor unions. Private market brokers might simply spring up, offering to match claimants with participating lawyers; the brokers would collect and update information on
lawyers in return for a cut of the action. Such a system of lay brokers
might effectively introduce the power of the market into the lawyerclient relationship in the personal injury area, accomplishing what the
BRT accomplished for its members and more. Like the BRT's legal
services plan, lay brokers might push contingent fee rates down. More
significantly still, lay brokers might be able to collect sufficient information about lawyers which would not only push standard fees down,
but also introduce new price competition in the personal injury legal
services market. Price competition, in turn, could mean lower tort administrative costs and even the mitigation of the queuing problem.
With information on the claimants' side, high-quality lawyers might be
able to maintain or even increase their current contingent fee structures, though the cases they would get would be the complex or otherwise challenging ones to which their skills would add considerable
value. Claimants with simpler claims would be able to select a lower
109. The analogy would be to the role that institutional investors play in selecting class counsel in securities litigation, or-out of the litigation context-to the role that mutual funds play
for individual investors in the selection of securities.
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fee arrangement without the anxiety that they were unwittingly opting
for a low-quality lawyer.
We cannot know for certain that for-profit lay claims brokers would
move the personal injury legal services market in this direction. But
little harm would likely come from the experiment. For-profit broker
intermediaries would be simple to put into place. Repealing the legal
ethics rules that currently bar fee sharing and referral fees between
lawyers and nonlawyers would authorize a market in claims brokers.
If claims brokers do not emerge, or if existing organizations such as
labor unions do not develop their own, then perhaps the existing contingent fee structure in the personal injury area is not higher than that
which a competitive market would produce. Abolishing the offending
legal ethics rules would hardly do much harm if the theory advanced
here is incorrect. If the contingent fee rates are in fact what a more
robust market would produce, we will not see successful brokerages
develop. 110
IV.

CONCLUSION

The creative vision of the private tort bar in rehabilitating the common law for the age of statutes is a truly remarkable moment in the
intellectual history of American law, one that too often goes unnoticed in histories of American legal thought, which spend more time in
the hallways of the law schools than in the law offices in which ideas
about the law have been crafted and implemented. Moreover, the
public policy system that modern American tort law has put into place
often performs brilliantly, even if it seems deeply flawed.
Nonetheless, the efforts of the plaintiffs' bar and its resistance to
administrative compensation systems have given rise to a new claimant-administrator relationship, one that reproduces some of the unconstrained authority about which the early leaders of the plaintiffs'
bar worried when they criticized public administration. Pound and the
early leaders of the plaintiffs' bar saw public administration as akin to
a dictatorship, but they and their successors have created a massive
private administrative system with many of the same attributes. When
Ross described the bureaucratization of torts practice three decades
ago, his book might well have been heralding the decline of the rule of
law in the torts area.1"1 After all, what Ross was describing was the
rise of administrative systems staffed by bureaucrats with significant
110. For similar theories, see generally KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 41 and
Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65 (2003).
111. Ross, supra note 20.
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amounts of discretionary managerial authority. The plaintiffs' lawyer,
in other words, has much of the discretionary power that characterizes
the managerial alternative to the rule of law in the jurisprudential
literature. Yet the regulatory regime for the market in plaintiffs'-side
legal services, a regime that is summed up by the promise and the
limits of the Railroad Trainmen case, has failed to grapple with the
private market-driven bureaucracies of the settlement system.
For those of us who are tempted to see something of genius in what
Kagan has called "the American way of law,"'1 12 taking the tort system
seriously requires applying its market principles not just to the primary regulatory problems of deterrence and compensation, but to the
secondary regulatory problems of the lawyer-client relationship that
arise out of our distinctively private approach to the law of personal
injury.
In particular, the efforts of the plaintiffs' bar have created a system
in which claimants' representatives are almost certainly unduly unconstrained with respect to the costs of the system that they help administer. We should view the project of reining in those costs, of exerting
these constraints, and of unleashing the power of the market in this
context as the full realization of the startlingly fresh and little-studied
regulatory vision of the twentieth-century American plaintiffs' bar.
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